general represent in no way either the Communities or the public; they function only in the interests of justice. Although the institution of the advocate-general is unknown in the common law systems, it is used extensively in French administrative law procedure. In fact, the advocate-general in the judicial organization of the Communities is modeled after the Government Commissioner of the French Conseil d'Etat, the most important of the French administrative courts and the apex of the French administrative court system. 5 Since the origins, powers, and objectives of the three European Communities are contained in international treaties signed by the six Member governments,' the Court, a creation of these treaties, has basically the character of an international tribunal. However, the competences assigned the Court by the three Treaties go far beyond the jurisdictional powers normally possessed by an international tribunal in the traditional sense. Indeed, the Court's role as an administrative and a constitutional tribunal has been much more significant than its role as an international tribunal. Moreover, the Treaties have conferred upon the Court in certain instances civil jurisdiction in a common law sense and in other cases have assigned to it the functions of a disciplinary court and of an arbitration tribunal. Access to the Court is not limited to the usual subjects of international law, the governments of states, but is also afforded to private persons-natural and legal-affected by the Treaties as well as to some of the institutions of the Communities. 7 The judgments of the Court can be enforced against private parties in the Member States in the same manner as those of the national courts. Enforcement of judgments against governments of the Member States is only possible under the ECSC Treaty which provides the imposition DE L'AciER 14 (1956) . Mr. Delvaux is one of the justices of the Court. For additional information see SCHWARTZ, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND THE COMMON LAW WORLD 23-41, 138-39 (1954) ; VALENTINE, THE COURT OFt JUSTICE OF THz EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMuNITY 44-48 (1955 of sanctions under certain conditions; the EEC and Euratom Treaties, however, have dispensed with the sanction procedure. 8 From its inception until the end of the 1962-63 term in July of 1963, the Court has rendered 103 decisions and opinions and at the time of adjournment nearly eighty cases were pending. In an appraisal of the case law developed by the Court up to 1960, Mr. Maurice Lagrange, one of the two advocates-general, declared that one striking fact stood out clearly: "The Court's role has been undoubtedly more important than had been foreseen; and, above all, it has been considerably different from that which had been visualized originally." 9 This statement of Mr. Lagrange applies to an even greater extent today; the judgments rendered by the Court since the end of 1960 have further enhanced the position of importance which the Court occupies within the Community of the six Member States, especially as far as economic developments are concerned.
See DELVAUX, LA COUR DE JUSTICE DE LA COMMUNAUT-EUROPAENE DU CHARBON ET
Many of the opinions which the Court has filed over the years have affected private enterprises in the Member countries and have often involved large sums of money, occasionally running into the millions of dollars. 10 Some of the decisions have resulted in profound economic changes with actual and potential social implications for certain population groups. 11 Others have dealt with the legality of governmental actions of the Member States; in several judgments the This decision was one of many arising out of the application of a system of subsidy payments for the equalization of the cost of scrap metal when this material was in short supply during the middle 1950's, and the world market price was high. Although the system was discontinued in 1958 when ample supplies of scrap metal became available, litigations as to the liability for these payments and their size continued, and even today forty-seven cases pertaining to the final settlement of outstanding payments are still pending before the Court (List of Cases pending before the Court, June 17, 1963 . These decisions sustained the first phase of the High Authority's longrange plan to make the Belgian coal industry more efficient. This plan included the closing of some of the Bplgian mines in which efficiency could not be sufficiently improved with the result ,that some of the Belgian miners were thrown out of work and had to be retrained for other occupations. Several decisions of the Court also dealt with the running conflict between the High Authority and the German Ruhr coal industry. The former would like to break up the strong cartelization of the sales activities for Ruhr coal, whereas the latter claims that too much competition might have deleterious effects upon the German coal miners. See, e.g., Ruhrkohlenverkaufsgesellschaften "Geitling", "Mausegatt" & "President" v Court has found such actions to contravene the Community law found in the Treaties, and, interestingly enough, the governments concerned have never refused to comply with rulings of the Court. 12 Finally, in three fairly recent instances the Court was requested by national tribunals in the Member States to issue rulings on the interpretation and application of the EEC Treaty which were then used as a basis for deciding cases pending before the national courts. ' In view of the far-reaching significance which the Court has obviously assumed for governments and private individuals alike in the Member States, one may be justified in asking who are the justices wielding such extensive power and responsibility. How are they appointed and under what conditions can they be removed from office? What are their duties and privileges, and what measure of judicial independence do they possess? The exploration of these and other questions concerning the justices of the Court of the European Communities is the purpose of this article.
II.

APPOINTMENT
In contrast to the specialized qualifications an individual must possess in France and in other Member States for appointment to judgeship on the highest court, the three Treaties use merely a general formula which states: "The judges ... shall be chosen from among persons of indisputable independence who fulfill the conditions required for the holding of the highest office in their respective country or who are jurists of recognized competence."' 4 (Emphasis added.)
This formula is in keeping with the Statute of the International Court 12. E.g., EEC Commission v. The Government of the Republic of Italy, (No. 10/61) February 27, 1962, 8 Sammlung 1. Italy had applied to radio parts imported from Member States a higher tariff than was justified by the tariff in force on January 1, 1958, the date which was to be used for the calculation of the progressive tariff reductions mandatory for the realization of the Common Market. A very recent decision sustains the EEC Commission against a complaint by the Federal Republic of Germany that its quota granted by the Commission for the import of oranges from countries other than Common Market members was too small. [VOL. 9 : p. 37
4 Villanova Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [1963] , Art. 4 https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol9/iss1/4 of Justice at The Hague which stipulates in Article 2 that the Court is to be composed of a "body of independent judges," elected from among persons "of high moral character, who possess the qualifications required in their country for appointment to the highest judicial offices or are jurisconsults of recognized competence in international law. "' 5 Prior to the establishment of the EEC and Euratom the pertinent provisions of the ECSC Treaty with regard to the qualifications for appointment to judgeship were even less stringent. The only requirements for appointment were "recognized independence and competence." As a consequence, it was possible for an individual without formal legal training to become a justice of the Court and two of the original judges appeared to have been "non-jurists."' 6 Today these two men are no longer members of the Court and all appointees must at least have a law degree, although it is not necessary for them to have had prior experience on the bench or to possess the specific, technical qualifications required for appointment to judicial office in their country.'
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The Treaties are silent about the nationality of the appointees for a judgeship. Since according to explicit provisions in the Treaties the members of the executive organs -the ECSC High Authority and the EEC and Euratom Commissions -must be nationals of the Member States,' some writers have concluded that such a requirement does not apply to the judges of the Court, and that therefore a national of any state may be appointed as a justice.' 9 However, the validity of the argument e contrario is open to serious doubt since the judges, in a broad sense, are civil servants of the Communities and the personnel statutes specify that normally only nationals of the Member States can be given a permanent civil service appointment. 2° In practice all judges so far have been citizens of the Member States, and an informal agreement between the Member governments as to the principle of allocating judgeships to the six Member States, which will be discussed later, makes it very unlikely that in the foreseeable future a controversy will arise as to the appointment of a justice who is not the national of a Member State. The term of office of the judges is six years and re-appointment at the end of the term is permissible. A partial renewal of the Court takes place every three years which affects three or four judges alternately. The three judges whose term of office expired at the end of the first term were chosen by lot.
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The length of tenure for the judges of the Court of the European Communities compares unfavorably with that of the International Court of Justice and its predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice. The statutes of the latter two courts provide for a tenure of nine years. 2 Only in the case of the former Central American Court of Justice did the judges of an international tribunal have a slightly shorter term of office than six years. 23 The relatively short period of service provided by the Treaties for the members of the Court has been criticised as tending to weaken the independence of the judges, and it has been asserted that the tenure provisions might reflect a desire on the part of the Member governments to preserve a degree of influence over the members of the Court. 24 This problem will be examined in greater detail subsequently.
The judges are appointed by the governments of the Member States "acting in common agreement. '25 This means that each of the six governments has a right of veto against the nomination of a judge by another government of the Member States. There is no knowledge that this veto has been used so far, and the fear of retaliation against future nominations makes it very unlikely that any of the six governments will ever exercise this right of veto. 28 The judges elect by secret ballot from among their members the president of the Court for a term of three years and this term is renewable. However, the first president of the Court of the Coal and Steel Community was not to be elected, but appointed by the Member governments, and the same procedure was prescribed and used for the selection of the first president of the Court of the European Communities. The appointments of the judges over the last ten years reveal an interesting pattern of informal allocation of judgeships to different countries and the special weight apparently attributed to the office of the president. When Mr. Pilotti was president of the Court, Italy had only one judge and the Netherlands had two. However, when Mr. Donner became the president, the ratio between the two countries was reversed. While France, Germany, and Belgium have been allotted only one judgeship, they are compensated by the allocation of one advocate-general each to France and Germany and by the assignment of the post of registrar of the Court to Belgium. 80 Only Luxembourg, tions on private persons. He may grant a stay in the execution of an action against which an appeal has been lodged with the Court, and he may issue interim orders. However, such rulings of the president are provisional and in no way prejudge the decisions of the Court on the substance of the matter before it. as the smallest country of the six, has been allotted merely one judgeship.
An informal agreement among the six governments as to the distribution of the posts of presidents between the executive organs and the Court also has a bearing on the pattern of positions within the Court. At the present time, the presidency of the EEC Commission is held by a German, the presidency of the Euratom Commission by a Frenchman, the chief executive of the High Authority is an Italian, and the president of the Court a national of the Netherlands. When after the expiration of Mr. Donner's first term as president the suggestion was made to nominate Mr. Riese, the German judge, as a candidate for this post, some of the governments of the Member States objected, even though according to the Treaties the president should be "elected" by the judges of the Court, and Mr. Riese might have had the necessary votes for his election. However, the election of Mr. Riese as the Court's president would have obviously disturbed the agreed patterns within the Court and among the major organs of the Communities and thus, for political reasons, the choice of nominees for the presidency of the Court was extremely restricted. 81 From the foregoing it becomes quite obvious that the governments of the Member States have, in practice, the exclusive power of appointing their nationals to the positions on the Court allotted to them. This system resembles to some extent that of the defunct Central American Court of Justice under which the legislatures of each of the five participating states appointed one judge to the Court.1 2 It contrasts with the method of selecting the judges for the International Court of Justice; they are elected by the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council from a list of candidates nominated by "national groups" and not by the governments.
Since the Treaties specify that the "governments" appoint the judges, the basic decision for the selection of a prospective justice is made by the cabinet in power in the Member State which has to fill an actual or future vacancy on the Court. In contrast to the practice in the Member States no participation by the parliament or any other governmental or political unit or the highest courts is required. The procedures to be utilized for the selection of an individual to serve as a judge of the Court are entirely within the discretion of the government. The assumption is justified that in essence the selection of a [VOL. 9: p. 37 8 Villanova Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [1963] , Art. 4 https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol9/iss1/4 judge is a political decision although considerations regarding the professional qualifications of the candidate for judgeship necessarily play a very large or possibly predominant role. The fact that the appointing government is guided by political motives and will attempt to select a candidate from its own ranks, is in itself of course neither unusual nor contemptible provided that the candidate is fully qualified. 4 Nevertheless, the danger exists that the criterion of party affiliation might be more important for an appointment than professional qualification, or that a less than fully qualified individual will be appointed who, for domestic political reasons, is to be removed from his position within the governmental structure of his country, but who, for public relations reasons, must be given a new billet which has the appearance of a promotion.
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The detailed procedures employed by the governments of the Member States for the selection of the judges for the Court vary from country to country. Since the last two judges appointed were Mr. Lecourt and Mr. Strauss it might be of interest to describe briefly the selection procedures used by the French and German governments.
In France the Foreign Minister has currently the primary responsibility for the selection of a justice of the Court, but he must consult the Minister of Justice before making the selection. The final decision rests with the Cabinet. The political parties are neither consulted nor informed, nor is there any consultation regarding the proposed candidate with any professional group such as the bar association or association of judges. Considered for selection are professors of public or economic law and justices of the highest courts in France such as the The office of a judge of the Court is terminated at the expiration of his term unless re-appointed; in addition, it may be terminated by the death of a judge or by his resignation. In the latter two cases, the successor holds office only during the unexpired period of his predecessor's term, as otherwise the rhythm of the partial renewal of the Court would be disturbed."' In the event of resignation, the retiring judge must continue to perform his duties until his successor assumes office. 89 During the first decade of the Court's existence, several judges have resigned from the bench; they are Mr. Catalano of Italy, Mr. Rueff of France, and Mr. Riese of Germany. Mr. Pilotti, the first president of the Court, and Mr. van Kleffens were not re-appointed at the expiration of their terms. Mr. Serrarens, who was one of the original threeyear appointees of the Court of the Coal and Steel Community, received a second full term but could not serve out his six years since he was [VOL. 9: p. 37
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Villanova Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [1963] Although the judge concerned does not participate in the deliberations regarding his dismissal, he must be invited by the president of the Court to appear before the other judges and advocates-general in closed session and to offer any statements or explanations. In the event that the Court decides to remove the judge from office, the registrar of the Court notifies the presidents of the other major organs of the Communities such as the Parliament, the executive organs, and the Council of Ministers. This notification constitutes the vacation of office;4" the dismissed judge does not continue to hold office until his successor assumes his duties." IV.
DUTIES AND PRIVILEGES
As is the usual custom for international as well as national courts, each judge, before undertaking his duties, must swear an oath "to perform his duties impartially and conscientiously and to preserve the secrecy of the Court's deliberations. 4 5 The oath may be sworn in the form prescribed by the national law of the individual judge. It is taken during the first public session of the Court and, according to the practice developed over the years, has become the center of a festive ceremony in which members of the Luxembourg government, high officials of the three Communities, and representatives of the bar associations in the Member States participate.
Immediately after a judge has been sworn in, he must make a solemn declaration that, both during and after his term of office, he will "respect the obligations resulting therefrom, in particular the duty of exercising honesty and discretion as regards the acceptance, after • . . [his] term of office, of certain functions and advantages." 4 6 In addition to the obligations contained in his oath, namely impartiality, conscientiousness, and the preservation of secrecy with regard to the deliberations of the Court, the judge has other duties as well. In order to ensure that the judge will devote all his efforts to the Court, he must reside at the seat of the Court which is Luxembourg. 47 ) ; Statute of the Court, art. 9 (ECSC Treaty). In view of the same reason as well as for the sake of impartiality, he may not hold any political and administrative office, nor is he permitted to engage in any paid or unpaid professional activities except by special exemption granted by the Council of Ministers. Finally, for the purpose of safeguarding his impartiality and conscientiousness, a judge may not participate in the settlement of any case in which he has previously participated as a representative, counsel, or advocate of one of the parties, or on which he has been previously called upon to decide as a member of a tribunal, or a commission of inquiry, or in any other capacity. In cases of difficulties in the application of these provisions the Court is requested to make a decision. 4 "
The obligations of the judges under the Statute of the Court of the ECSC Treaty are somewhat broader and in some respects more specific. They are not only prohibited from engaging in professional activities, but also in business activities and, in particular, "they may not acquire or hold, directly or indirectly, any interest in any business related to coal or steel during their term of office and during a period of three years thereafter." 49 Since these provisions are not in conflict with the Statutes of the Court of the EEC and Euratom Treaties, one must conclude that they are still in effect. The framers of these Statutes seem to have purposely omitted the detailed restraints as specified in the ECSC Statute because of the much larger scope of the EEC and Euratom Treaties and instead used a more general formula to fix the duties of the judges of the Court. However, there seems to have been no intention to abrogate the specific provisions of the ECSC Statute of the Court. 50 As a consequence, a newly appointed judge is obligated to dispose of any shares of steel or coal enterprises that he or possibly his family may own when entering office.
The Treaties endow the judges with certain specific immunities and privileges. First, in order to strengthen their independence and impartiality, the justices of the Court are granted immunity from legal process; this immunity continues after the expiration of their term with regard to any acts performed by them in their official capacity including anything that they may have spoken or written. This immunity, however, may be lifted by the Court sitting in plenary session. In that difficult housing situation in Luxembourg, this requirement may result in temporary separation of the judge from his family. event, penal action may be brought against a judge, but such a case is justiciable within any of the Member States only before the tribunal competent to try judges of the "highest national judiciary."51 The suspension of the immunity from legal process appears to be limited to penal action, and is not permitted if civil actions such as breach of contract or defamation are involved.
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Second, the judges of the Court, as all civil servants of the Communities, enjoy in each of the Member States exemption from any national tax on their salaries. 53 They may also import free of duty their household effects when taking up their position in Luxembourg, and may remove them free of tax to their own country at the end of their term of office. Furthermore, neither they nor their families are to be subjected to any immigration restrictions or formalities. 54 Third, the judges, as civil servants in a broad sense, seem to benefit from a provision in the personnel statutes of the Communities which requires each institution to furnish assistance to their civil servants in case of threats, insults, libel, and other attacks that may be aimed at them or their families because of their official positions or their official activities. The Communities are obliged to compensate the affected civil servant for damages suffered unless he can obtain indemnification from the malefactor. 55 This provision may contribute, in a certain measure, to the preservation of the judges' independence and impartiality.
V. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
Although the maximization of judicial independence is a recognized goal for both national and international courts, the attainment of this goal is generally more complicated in the case of a multi-national judiciary. Without a lengthy term of office, preferably life tenure, decent remuneration, and stringent safeguards against arbitrary removal, judicial independence is likely to be an empty phrase. In addition, the judges must be individuals who have no other occupation, and thus will be able to devote their full time to the discharge of their judicial responsibility. Finally, the methods of selection have a significant bearing on the judges' independence. Possibly, the problem of selection has caused more difficulty than any other in the staffing of international tribunals. How strongly is judicial independence institutionalized in the Court of Justice of the European Communities? According to the Treaties the judges shall be chosen from among persons of "indisputable independence," and they must swear that they will perform their duties "impartially and conscientiously." 5 These requirements, however, are primarily programmatic exhortations and guidelines; they cannot assure a judge's independence.
On the other hand, some of the provisions of the Treaties fulfill certain of the criteria put forth above, and thus -contribute materially to the strengthening of judicial independence. The judges cannot be removed from office except by their peers and then only when they "no longer fulfill the required conditions or meet the obligations of their office." '5 7 Although this is a flexible clause, one can trust the other judges to apply it with the utmost care and diligence since it is an extraordinary remedy. The judges are not permitted to engage in activities that may distract them from their main task at the Court. They are barred from participating in any case with which they have previously been concerned as agent or counsel for one of the parties or as a member of a tribunal or commission of inquiry. And a novel, but highly commendable principle introduced by the framers of the Treaties makes it impossible for a party to a litigation to invoke either the nationality of a judge, or the absence from the bench of a judge of the party's own nationality as grounds to request a change in the composition of the Court or one of its chambers.
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The salaries of the judges of the Court exceed those normally paid in Continental Europe for such positions, and their size can be assumed to bolster judicial independence. The base pay of the judges is dollars 12,000, that of the president of the Court dollars 15,000. The judges also receive a quarters allowance amounting to fifteen per cent of their salaries and a special expense allowance which is ten per cent of the base pay for the judges and twenty per cent for the president of the Court. Moreover, provisions are made for free accident insurance as well as retirement and other social security benefits. When a judge is not reappointed he is entitled to a separation allowance which consists of fifty per cent of his last salary to be paid for a period of three years. 9 The salaries and other benefits are not paid to the judges by their national governments (as was the case, for instance, with the judges of the defunct Central American Court of Justice) but by the three Communities which share these expenditures-another factor that tends to strengthen the independence of the justices. 6 " Despite these favorable provisions of the Treaties, the independence of the judges of the Court was questioned even before the Court came into being in 195261, and a certain amount of criticism in this respect has continued until today. 2 This criticism centers primarily on the relatively short period of the judges' tenure and the methods of appointment and re-appointment, which, as has been pointed out earlier, lie entirely within the discretion of the governments of the Member States. Since for re-appointment the justices are exclusively dependent upon their own governments, which are often parties to disputes before the Court, they may be tempted, on occasion, to let thoughts of the future color their thoughts of the present. If a judge should be denied re-appointment by his government, he might be without employment for some time or may have to accept a much less desirable position than the one from which he resigned in order to enter the service of the Communities. Mr. Etienne Hirsch's failure to be re-appointed by the French government to the presidency of the Euratom Commission after his first term expired in January of 1962,63 and the fact that some of the judges of the Coal and Steel Community Court were replaced when it became the Court of the three Communities, undoubtedly are remembered by the justices of the Court. 4 Fortunately, for the protection of the judges' independence, the Treaties and the Statutes of the Court make no provision for dissenting opinions to the decisions of the Court. While sound arguments can be made for the publication of dissenting opinions as having a salutary influence upon the jurisdiction of the Court, 5 it may also lead to an emergence of national interests within the Court, which would not only be detrimental to the independence and impartiality of the judges, but possibly also to the authority of the Court. 66 Judge Riese declared, in 1958, that fears the short term of office and the appointment procedure for the judges would endanger their independence, have proved to be unfounded. He stated that "in no case have the judges been guided by extraneous, political or nationalistic viewpoints." 7 In all likelihood, the statement applies just as much to the present judges as it did when Mr. Riese wrote these words. Yet from an institutional point of view, the danger to the independence of the Court's judges continues to exist until the provisions of the Treaties with regard to the length of their terms of office and the methods of their appointments have been changed in such a manner as to fully insure their independence.
A number of valid proposals to attain this objective have been made. With regard to the term of office, it has been suggested that the judges should be appointed either for life or at least for twelve years with-payment of their full salaries for life. With regard to the method of appointment, it has been proposed to establish a selection committee within the European Parliament or to have this Parliament elect the judges from a list submitted by the governments of the Member States. Another proposal advocates the selection of new judges for position vacancies by the Court itself, possibly from a list prepared by the highest courts in the Member States. In this manner the highest quality of the judges would be assured since normally members of the highest courts are in the best position to evaluate the qualifications of candidates for judgeships. The least desirable proposal appears to be the adoption of the system used by the International Court of Justice at The Hague since it is extremely complicated and cumbersome. 68 To put into effect any of the above proposals requires a revision of the Treaties. However, the political relations existing at present between the Member States make any revision of the Treaties in the near future a very unlikely undertaking since it is doubtful that agreement by all Member governments on the solution of controversial problems could be reached. 
VI. THE BACKGROUND OF THE JUDGES
The extensive powers which the justices of the Court of the European Communities hold in their hands makes it essential to inquire as to what sort of men have become justices of that Court and of its predecessor, the Court of the Coal and Steel Community. After all, there is little question that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties and the legal rules derived from them, the backgrounds and economic and political philosophies of the judges are likely to be reflected in the Court's decisions whenever the possibility of choice from among a number of legally acceptable principles presents itself.
In keeping with the provisions of the ECSC Treaty, that judges of the Court did not need to be jurists," 9 two of the original members of the Court lacked a formal legal education. These gentlemen were Mr. Serrarens and Mr. Rueff. All the other judges had completed their formal law studies, two of them, Mr. Donner and Mr. Trabucchi, receiving their doctor of law degrees cum laude.
Of the academically trained jurists who have served on the Court, three judges, or less than thirty per cent of the justices, seem to have had substantial previous experience on the bench. They are Justices Hammes, Riese, and Rossi. Mr. Pilotti, Mr. van Kleffens, and Mr. Strauss also have had judicial experience, but their careers as judges appear to have been rather limited. Four of the judges have practiced law or acted as legal counsel to private enterprises or public organizations. They are Catalano, Delvaux, Lecourt and van Kleffens, but none of them seem to have been a practitioner recently. Five of the justices have been professors of law; while for Justices Hammes and Catalano the academic careers appeared to have played only a minor role. Justices Donner, Riese, and Trabucchi have distinguished themselves as academicians and have occupied positions of leadership in legal societies and conferences. Finally, four of the judges, Hammes, Catalano, Rossi, and Pilotti, performed for short periods of time the functions of prosecutor in their respective countries.
It is interesting to note that several judges occupied important executive and administrative positions. Delvaux was for a short time This variety of backgrounds of the justices of the Court revealed by this brief survey is surprising; especially when one considers that in France, Germany, and many other countries on the Continent of Europe most judges are professionally trained and rise through a career service to the highest judical positions in their countries. In the United States, a great deal of attention has been focused in recent years upon the question of whether individuals should have experience on the bench before they are considered eligible for appointment to the Supreme Court. Professor John R. Schmidhauser, in his study of the politics and personalities of the members of the United States Supreme Court comes to the conclusion that "there is little in the history of the Supreme Court to suggest that justices with prior judicial experience were more objective or better qualified than those who lacked such experience."" Schmidhauser points out that some of the Court's most distinguished members, among them Marshall, Taney, Hughes, Brandeis, and Stone, were totally lacking in this experience before their appointments to the Supreme Court.
In view of the comprehensive jurisdiction of the Court which imposes on it the obligation to solve legal problems in the economic, social, administrative, and even political sphere, the varied backgrounds and experiences of the judges of the Court may be an advantage. 72 Indeed, if the three Communities and their institutions may be viewed as the possible forerunners of a federal governmental system for the Member States, the broad knowledge possessed by some of the justices in the fields of economics, finance, and administration may be a significant factor in arriving at decisions which transcend narrow judicial considerations, and which reflect an application of the Treaties with a keen eye on the purpose of the Communities and with an appreciation for the future. 73 The assumption is justified that the diversity of interests, experiences, and values represented in the deliberating sessions of the Court may have stimulated a fertile interchange of concepts and ideas and thus broadened the views of the participants. On the other hand, the exclusive appointment of career judges might have led to conflicting narrow parochial attitudes among the justices with the result that some of the judgments might have represented merely compromises between national legal doctrines and traditions. 74 Of course, 74. See Riese, op. cit. supra note 64, at 273. In the deliberations of the judges the language problem has at times been an impediment since the judges of the Court have not been chosen for their linguistic abilities, but for their knowledge of the law. Although all documents before the Court are translated into the four official languages recognized by the Treaties-French, German, Italian, and Dutch-and while a simultaneous translation is provided during oral procedures (cf., RuLEs or PRoctoURX, arts. 29-31), translators are not used during the secret deliberations of the Court concerning the decision in a case. The practice has been to use the French language during these deliberations which put at a serious disadvantage those judges whose mother tongue was not French and who had not mastered the intricacies and nuances of the French legal jargon. For more information regarding this problem see Riese, op. cit. supra note 64, at 272, and Baec.hle, op. cit. supra note 17, at 51-55. experience on the bench cannot be disregarded as an important qualification for the justices of the Court. The ideal composition of the Court of the European Communities might be a mixture of both career judges and men with a thorough legal background that have had experiences and proven themselves competent in high positions in administration, business, and the labor movement.
It might be interesting to speculate as to how much the attitudes of the judges toward European integration influenced the decisions of the Court. Since the average age of the judges is almost sixty-one years, 7 " most of them have had first-hand experience with the miseries of two world wars. One may assume, therefore, with some justification that the judges view a united Europe as a means of preventing the use of war as an instrument for the settlement of disputes between the European states. In addition, some of the judges participated prominently in international conferences, held positions with international organizations, and were active in movements for a united Europe. Although it might be possible to conclude from the experiences of the judges that a majority, at least, looks with favor upon the political unification of Europe-which of course would also increase the prestige of the Court and their positions as judges-there is no indication that such an attitude has resulted generally in a very strong pro-integrationist jurisprudence. 7 6 Rather, most of the judgments of the Court reflect a desire to render decisions which are practicable within the framework of the Treaties and which take into consideration the sometimes painful economic changes and dislocations that are being brought about by the goals and principles set forth in the Treaties. That the Court has refrained from a very strong pro-integrationist course is a sign of political wisdom, since such a course might well have aroused vigorous resentment within the governments of the Member States and among politically influential economic groups with the result that economic and especially political integration would actually have been impeded.
The future of the Court, nevertheless, is closely tied to the future of economic and political integration of the Member States. As integration progresses, the role of the Court will increase in importance; at the same time, the growing number of decisions of the Court- nearly eighty cases were pending in the summer of 1963-reflects confidence in the Court and is therefore a significant factor for the progress of integration. The increasing workload of the Court may make it necessary to expand the number of judges in the future. The Treaties have anticipated this possibility; upon the request of the Court, the Council of Ministers may by unanimous vote increase the number of judges.
7 Thus the way is paved for the gradual realization of Jean Monnet's prediction, made more than ten years ago, that the Court would eventually become the Supreme Court of a European Federation.
77. Euratom Treaty, art. 137; EEC Treaty, art. 165; ECSC Treaty, art. 32.
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